1. International Finance:Managing Capital Flows and Financial Risks
Joint CCER-World Bank Institute course
July 16-20, Beijing, China1
2. Capital Flow Volatility and Financial Risks:OverviewDr. Yan Wang, Senior Economist
Managing Capital Flows and Financial Risks,
a CCER-WBI joint course
July 16-20, Beijing, China2
3. Capital Flow Volatility & Financial RisksI. Rise and Fall of Capital Flows
Capital flow volatility
Implicit government guarantees
market failures
Volatility hurts growth and hurts the poor most
II. New issues in managing risks
Fiscal risks and gov’t contingent liabilities
Derivatives and risks
“Value at Risk”
Early warning indicators
Short term flows and crises
III. Policy options to manage financial risks
A spectrum of capital flow interventions
Chile: reserve requirements for short term inflows: pros and cons
Sound banking system and regulations: currency risk exposure and etc.
Competition and corporate governance crucial for market discipline
Summary3
4. Global Integration and Capital Flow Volatility4
5. The rise and fall of international capital flows:capital market flows are volatileSource:
GDF 2000.5
6. Capital Flow Volatility: FDI is More StableSource: GDF, 19996
7. Large reversals in net private capital flows7
8. Capital Flow Volatility is linked with Volatile GrowthRelationship between economic growth variability and volatility in private foreign capital flowsSource: Thomas et al “The Quality of Growth,” 2000.8
9. 1970-791980-841985-891990-9601020304050Number of episodesSystemiccrisesSmallercrisesCapital Flow Volatility is linked with Frequency in Systemic Banking CrisesFrequent Banking Crisis9
10. Banking Crises and aftermath are extremely costly for the real economy: unfair burden for the poorHigh Cost of Banking Crises10
11. Growth Volatility hurts the poor mostSource: Thomas et al “The Quality of Growth”, 2000.11
12. Financial Deepening in the Domestic Economy can facilitate Economic Growth, however...Source:Thomas et al “The Quality of Growth, 12000.12
13. Capital Account Openness is negatively related with GDP GrowthSource: Thomas et al “The Quality of Growth,” 2000.13
14. II. New Issues in managing risks: an overview of new topics in this courseFinancial and fiscal risks are linked
Capital flow volatility may lead to a rising government contingent liabilities
Derivatives may lead to heightened systemic risks (see Steinherr’s book)
“Value at risk” method is important
Early warning indicators of financial crises
Short term debt should be controlled, regulated, and monitored, carefully.14
15. Fiscal cost of banking crises, % of GDP15
16. Derivatives may lead to heightened systemic risk: Markets have been growing rapidly, 1991-199716
17. Value at Risk (VAR) is an important tool to measure risk“The Daily Earning at Risk for our combined trading activities averaged approximately $15million…”
J.P. Morgan 1994 annual report
VAR summarizes the expected maximum loss (or worst loss) over a target horizon (day/month) within a given confidence interval.
It allows us to estimate company-wide risks in one number and compare across different companies/markets
It is now widely used in firms and banks.17
18. Value at Risk (VAR): for general distribution and an exampleDefine W0 as initial investment, R rate of return, then at the end of the day/month, W=W0(1+R). Denote the expected return as and volatility of R as ; and the lowest portfolio value at the given confidence level c as W*=W0(1+R*). VAR is defined as the dollar loss relative to the mean,
Value at Risk (mean)=E(W)-W*= - W0(R*- ) (1)
J.P. Morgan’s distribution of daily revenue in 1994: Mean revenue is $5.1m, n=254. Select c=95%, 254x5%=12.7. In the chart, we find the 5% of occurrences (15 obs) below -$9m. After interpolating, we find W*= -$9.6m
The VAR of daily revenues, relative to the mean is
VAR = E(W) – W*= $5.1m- (-$9.6m) = $14.7m (2)
Absolute VAR=$9.6m18
19. Short Term Capital Flows are Linked to Financial Fragility: Short term debt/reserve ratios peaked before crisesSource: GDF, 199919
20. Short Term Debt /Reserve Ratios are good warning indicators of financial fragility: It peaked before the Peso crisisSource: GDF, 199920
21. Short-term Debt as percent of international reserves: a liquidity index21
22. Short-term Debt as percent of international reserves: a good warning indicator22
23. GDP growth and growth of short-term debt:Pro-cyclical to growth and exacerbate boom/bust23
24. GDP growth and growth of short-term debt:Pro-cyclical to growth and exacerbate crises24
25. III. Policy options to manage fiscal and financial risksA spectrum of capital flow interventions
Chile: reserve requirements for short term inflows: pros and cons
Prudential fiscal policy and disciplines
Do not provide implicit guarantees
Sound banking system and regulations: regulate foreign currency exposure
Competition and corporate governance crucial for market discipline
Summary
25
26. Policy Options: A Spectrum of Capital Flow Interventions1. Financial Autarky
2. Quantity Controls (All Capital Inflows)
3. Tax/Non-Remunerated Reserve Requirement (All Capital Inflows)
4. Quantity Control on “Risky” Inflows
5. Tax on “Risky” Inflow
6. Remunerated Liquidity Requirements
7. Purchase Insurance (e.g:- Contingent Liquidity Facility)
8. Other Risk Management Techniques (Asset/Liability Management)
9. No Intervention Reduce Capital Inflows
Change Inflow Composition
Self-Insurance
Risk Management1st. Best
WorldNth. Best
WorldIncreasingly Severe Intervention: Reduction in Benefits of Foreign Capital & Reduction in RisksSource: Powell, On Liquidity Requirements, Capital Controls and Risk Management: Some Theoretical Considerations
and Practice from the Argentine Banking Sector, 199926
27. Policy Options: Market Based Capital Control for Short Term Inflows in ChileSource: Schmidt-Hebbel & Hernandez, Capital Controls in Chile: Effective? Efficient? Endurable?, 199927
28. Chile and Malaysia: Two cases of Temporary Capital Controls for Short Term InflowsSource: GDF 199928
29. Chile: Short term capital inflows have been declining: URR is effectiveSource: GDF 199929
30. Malaysia: Short Term Capital Inflow declined temporarilySource: GDF 199930
31. Pros and cons of Chile’s URRPros
Provide more room for the use of independent monetary policy
led to a fall in short term inflows, reducing Chile’s indebtedness
changed the composition of capital inflows toward longer maturities, making Chile more resilient to shocksCons
did not affect the real exchange rate
led to an inefficient allocation of resources
led to higher short term interest rates, reducing investment and LT growth
provided incentive for tax evasion.31
32. SummaryInformation asymmetry and market imperfection prevail in financial markets--roles for government
Capital flow is volatile in nature and volatility hurts the poor most--rationale for public policy
Tight fiscal discipline good, guarantees are bad
Sequencing in financial openness key
Correcting incentives, building institutions and enforcing regulations crucial
Market-based control on ST flows helps
Early detection of problems is possible
Decisive restructuring vital32