• 1. Lessons from Competitve ExperiencesW.A. Fischer CEIBS, Shanghai February 1, 19996/7/20181William A. Fischer
    • 2. Understanding Rivalry: The Heart of the Competitive Equation6/7/20182William A. Fischer
    • 3. The Nature of Economic Inquiry ?the focus of economics [from a Western, market-oriented perspective] has largely been on how well an economy allocates resources, given preferences and technologies.Richard R. Nelsonespecially where firms are the principal allocating agents 6/7/20183William A. Fischer
    • 4. The Nature of the Players ?economists tend to see firms as players in a multi-actor economic game ...Richard R. Nelson6/7/20184William A. Fischer
    • 5. The Nature of Rivalry The essence of rivalry is a striving for potentially incompatible positions ?Frederic M. Scherer ?the jockeying for share by firms within a market.Besanko, Dranove & Shanley6/7/20185William A. Fischer
    • 6. Who are these 揻irms?and what are their roles? Some fundamental assumptions搮 an entity run by agents of the capital-owning principals with the sole objective of maximizing the profits of the latter 厰Ronald Dorethus, in 搈odern?market economy, we can separate management from ownership...6/7/20186William A. Fischer
    • 7. Other Underlying Assumptionsprofits [surpluses] being seen as a signal of performance in a market a faith in market allocation of resources in complex situations over government allocation -- because the customer is voting with their purchases the maximization of the overall social welfare function by the accumulation of numerous personal decisions -- the customer being seen as being in the best position to determine what they want6/7/20187William A. Fischer
    • 8. Establishing the Arena[A market is] that set of suppliers and demanders whose trading establishes the price of a good.George Stigler & Robert SherwinCustomersSuppliers Rivalry6/7/20188William A. Fischer
    • 9. In such a classical market setting, it is important to consider economies of scaleThe history of the industrial revolution was one of economies of scale.6/7/20189William A. Fischer
    • 10. The Centrality of Scale EconomiesThe Economics of the Industrial RevolutionStatic Economies Dynamic EconomiesCost per UnitRated Capacity of FacilityCost per UnitCumulative Production of A Standardized ItemTheoretical6/7/201810
    • 11. In such a classical market setting, it is important to consider economies of scaleThe history of the industrial revolution was one of economies of scale. In markets where consumers are price sensitive, larger firms can use their cost advantage to gain an appreciable advantage over smaller firms. In the US, it has been shown that firm size is positively correlated with profitability. However, cause and effect are not well-established. Also, larger shares for some, mean lower shares for others.6/7/201811William A. Fischer
    • 12. In such a classical market setting, it is important to consider economies of scaleThe history of the industrial revolution was one of economies of scale. But even in such a non-complex setting, bigger was not always better. In fact, in studies in the US, mid-century, minimum optimal plant/firm size appeared to be small relative to market size [single-digit].6/7/201812William A. Fischer
    • 13. The Centrality of Scale EconomiesThe Economics of the Industrial RevolutionStatic Economies Dynamic EconomiesCost per UnitRated Capacity of FacilityCost per UnitCumulative Production of A Standardized ItemTheoretical & Empirical6/7/201813
    • 14. In such a classical market setting, it is important to consider economies of scaleBut even in such a non-complex setting, bigger was not always better. One of the lessons of the Japanese manufacuring triumphs of the last three decades has been the importance of learning, through repetitive manufacturing, which is different than just being bigger or smarter.6/7/201814William A. Fischer
    • 15. The Centrality of Scale EconomiesThe Economics of the Industrial RevolutionStatic Economies Dynamic EconomiesCost per UnitRated Capacity of FacilityCost per UnitCumulative Production of A Standardized ItemTheoretical & Empirical6/7/201815
    • 16. In such a classical market setting, it important to consider economies of scaleOne of the lessons of the Japanese manufacuring triumphs of the last three decades has been the importance of learning, through repetitive manufacturing. Yet, learning, especially when based on repetition, comes with the risk of rigidity if the focus is too-much on consistent cost-reduction.6/7/201816William A. Fischer
    • 17. The Importance of Market Maturityempirical research on 113 US manufacturing firms by CEIBS faculty ?nearly one half of the revenues generated by the 11 most successful firms ?came from mature markets. However, 77 percent of revenues for 15 of the least successful firms came from mature markets.Capon, Farley & Hoenig6/7/201817William A. Fischer
    • 18. but, markets are changing; they are no longer classical nor simple6/7/201818William A. Fischer
    • 19. The History of Competition was marked by successive Industrial Revolutions6/7/201819William A. Fischer
    • 20. Tomorrow抯 Markets will be characterized by:* Increasingly demanding customers * An emerging global arena * An amalgamation of markets and resource pools [EU, NAFTA, etc.] * The appearance of adversarial trade * Neo-Kondratieffian technology changes * The quickening of the product life-cycle * The emergence of the knowledge-based information economy * An acceptance of new organizational formats [Alliances, jvs, wofes, etc.]6/7/201820William A. Fischer
    • 21. The Death of Firms A dying company does not lead; it follows. It is losing market share, it is losing capabilities, it has the wrong set of competencies, it is demoralized, its activities have little impact. In fact, all around us we can observe companies that are in a state worse than death - they have joined the living dead, aware (or not) that whatever they do makes little difference to their situation, and yet they feel compelled to keep on acting, producing, carrying on. Death is most often a long drawn out affair. Even with inept management, it still takes a long time to destry a large company with once strong, if currently obsolete capabilities. Death is no stranger to the ranks of once powerful manufacturing companies. Every industry has its share of the dead, as well as the terminally ill and the walking wounded.Tom Vollmann:6/7/201821William A. Fischer
    • 22. Death Signals of the non-competitivestaying level of falling behind the competition risk aversion bureaucracy losing capabilities erosion of what were once distinctive competencies internal focusing of corporate attention limited knowledge of the customer panic decisions to reduce short-run costs not developing people ? Tom Vollmann 6/7/201822William A. Fischer
    • 23. In Hyper-competitive MarketsSuch as those characterizing global markets in the late 20th century, that are filled with 搒urprises? 1. the ability to navigate from one product generation to another is the basis for sustained competitive advantage. Think about Wang! 2. great organizations are necessary to produce great products (more than once), while great products do not guarantee great organizations. 3. 揌igh returns are not sustainable in a particular market, but the process of generating high returns can be sustainable. last quote is from: Capon, Farley & Hoenig6/7/201823William A. Fischer
    • 24. Early Lessons from In Search of ExcellenceExcellent firms are characterized by (among other things:Bias for Action Close to the Customer Autonomy & Entrepreneurship Focus Simple form, Lean staffPeters & Waterman6/7/201824William A. Fischer
    • 25. More recent findings from EuropeExcellent European firms are characterized by (among other things):Devolving leadership (without losing control or direction) Driving radical change (in the entire corporate system, not just in its parts) Reshaping culture Dividing to rule (winning the rewards of smallness while staying or growing large) Keeping the competitive edge (in a world where the old ways of winning no longer work) Achieving constant renewalRobert Heller6/7/201825William A. Fischer
    • 26. Determinants of Financial Performancecompeting in relatively concentrated markets with higher market share competing in growing markets high investment in developing new products & services high involvements in markets outside of US low debt levels an entreprenurial atmosphereempirical research on 113 US manufacturing firms by CEIBS facultyCapon, Farley & Hoenig6/7/201826William A. Fischer
    • 27. Comparing High & Low Performersempirical research on 113 US manufacturing firms by CEIBS facultyHigh-Performing High-Share Focused Innovatorsconcentrate capital investment in growing international markets generate new products from high R&D budgets are highly vertically integrated have little diversification have low debt highly specialized in their organizationHigh-Performing Focused World Consumeristsfocus less internationally spend heavily on advertising have low debt diversification almost nonexistentCapon, Farley & Hoenig6/7/201827William A. Fischer
    • 28. Comparing High & Low Performersempirical research on 113 US manufacturing firms by CEIBS facultyLow-Performing Diversified Indentured Industrialistsspend little on R&D were frequently involved in mergers conducted under duress are highly diversified have high debt only average on international investmentCapon, Farley & Hoenig6/7/201828William A. Fischer
    • 29. Navigating Resources & InformationInformation ComplexityHighLowResource ScarcityLowHighLawrence & DyerDevelopment Paths for a Typical Industry6/7/201829William A. Fischer
    • 30. this will mean changing the ways in which we do business6/7/201830William A. Fischer
    • 31. Dimensions of TransformationSpeedFastSlowScopeBroadNarrowDoing Different ThingsDoing the Same Things BetterTurnaroundTransformationReengineeringContinuous ImprovementSource: Tom Vollmann6/7/201831William A. Fischer
    • 32. and, changing the businesses we do6/7/201832William A. Fischer
    • 33. Industry Restructuring as Value Migration Market Value is a measure of the power of a business design to create and capture value. Adrian J. Slywotzky Customers make choices based on their priorities. Those choices develop potential value for the businesses from which they buy. At any given time, the pattern of those choices allocates value to various business designs. As customers?priorities change and new designs present customers with new options, they make new choices. They reallocate value. These changing priorities, and the way in which they interact with new competitors?offerings, are what trigger, enable, or facilitate the Value Migration process. Adrian J. Slywotzky 6/7/201833William A. Fischer
    • 34. Value Migration today in China?..The firms that are winning in the China market are those that control their value-chains, especially down-stream from manufacturing! Building brands makes the difference in competing on factors other than price: brand & customer service requires value-chain discipline. National brands are being built today, as in the past, by value-chain control.6/7/201834William A. Fischer
    • 35. in China, value migration results in ...Focusing solely on transport costs may ignore 75% of the distribution costs. In China, nearly 2/3 of distribution costs comes in product loss & damage, and the associated inventory costs. Customer service & accounts receivable both benefit from value-chain control.Business China 12/07/986/7/201835William A. Fischer
    • 36. Industry Restructuring & Value MigrationValue Migration is not new. Value migrated away Ford抯 vertically integrated, single-car-focused business design toward GM抯 price-laddered business design in the 1920s. It moved from grocery store chains to supermarkets in the 1930s, from fragmented merchandisers to national catalogue sales in the 1890s (Sears), and to national merchandise chains in the 1920s (Sears again). Adrian J. Slywotzky There are always winners and losers in the Value Migration process.6/7/201836William A. Fischer
    • 37. We Must Re-etablish the Arena [there is a big difference between] defining competitors as 搕hose companies that do the same thing that we do 厯 [and] defining them [instead] as those business designs that customers can choose from in satisfying their priorities.Adrian J. Slywotzky[Where] a business design is the totality of how a company selects its customers, defines & differentiates its offerings, defines the tasks it will perform ? configures its resources, goes to market, creates utility for its customers and earning a profit from that activity. 6/7/201837William A. Fischer
    • 38. The Broader Version of RivalryThreat of New EntrantsCustomersSuppliers SubstitutesRivalrymore of 搕hose companies that do the same thing that we do 厯those [other] business designs that customers can choose from in satisfying their priorities.6/7/201838William A. Fischer
    • 39. Industry Policy & Organizational Choices Much of the present-day debate over industrial policy is implicitly a debate over organizational patterns and structures. Richard N. Langlois & Paul L. Robertson6/7/201839William A. Fischer
    • 40. Determining Organizational Forms ?devising and learning to use effectively a significantly new organizational form involves much the same kind of uncertainty, experimental groping, and learning by making mistakes and correcting them that marks technological ?innovation. New modes of organization aren抰 simply 揷hosen?when circumstances make them appropriate. They ?evolve in a manner that is foreseen only dimly. And even when a firm makes a conscious decision to change organization, it may take a long time before it is comfortable and effective in its new suit of clothes. Richard R. Nelson 6/7/201840William A. Fischer
    • 41. The Nature of RivalryGeorge Stigler抯 Survival principle: ?competition of different sizes of firms sifts out the more efficient enterprises.Just as the fittest species surive in their natural environments, the fittest firms survive in their market environments.6/7/201841William A. Fischer